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"You CAN LEAD A HORSE TO WATER
": THE SUPREME COURT'S
REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE EXERCISE OF
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CONFERRED BY
CONGRESS
Donald L. Doernberg*
IN THE EARLY days of the republic, controversy about the fed-
eral judiciary and the extent of its power abounded. At the Con-
stitutional Convention, the major debate concerned whether there
should be any inferior federal courts, and if so, what powers they
should have.' When the Constitution was circulated among the
states for ratification, Alexander Hamilton devoted considerable
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member of the Class of 1992.
1. See, e.g., M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 79-80 (1913):
That there should be a national judiciary was readily accepted by all. Nor
was there any controversy over the jurisdiction of such courts as might be estab-
lished; indeed, the clauses of the original resolution indicating the subjects of
jurisdiction were unanimously struck out "in order to leave full room for their
organization." There was also only a slight discussion over the appointment of
the judges. . . . The most serious question was that of the inferior courts. The
difficulty lay in the fact that they were regarded as an encroachment upon the
rights of the individual states. It was claimed that the state courts were perfectly
competent for the work required, and that it would be quite sufficient to grant an
appeal from them to the national supreme court. The decision that was reached
was characteristic . . . the matter was compromised: inferior courts were not
required, but the national legislature was permitted to establish them.
See also id. at 154-55 (noting the argument made at the Constitutional convention that
inferior federal courts should be court of appeal from state court decisions); J. Madison,
NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 71-73 (1966) (noting that
the discretionary power the Constitution gives Congress to establish inferior courts replaced
a resolution at the Constitutional convention requiring mandatory establishment of such
courts).
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time to discussing the proposed federal judiciary, dwelling particu-
larly on its limitations and how difficult it would be for the judici-
ary to usurp power.' Despite Hamilton's arguments, however, in
the first decades under the new Constitution questions concerning
the extent of judicial power revolved around assertions or percep-
tions that the judiciary had exceeded its proper scope.3 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's penchant for expansive readings of the Constitu-
tion to facilitate the scope and exercise of federal judicial power
unquestionably fueled such controversies."
It would no doubt shock Chief Justice Marshall to know that
today the federal courts routinely refuse to accept cases that are
within the scope of the constitutional grant of power to the judici-
ary,5 and for which Congress has authorized original jurisdiction
2. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-84 (A. Hamilton) (discussing the compo-
sition, appointment, tenure and partition of authority in the federal judiciary).
3. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), initially drew
fire on the theory that the assertion of the power of judicial review was a usurpation by the
federal judiciary for as President Thomas Jefferson noted:
Nothing in the Constitution has given [the Supreme Court] a right to de-
cide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. The opin-
ion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional,
and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the
Legislature and Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a des-
potic branch.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), quoted in E. CORWIN,
COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 69-70 (1950). Professor Corwin notes that Jefferson's attack
was echoed in 1832 by President Jackson. Id. at 70-71; see also 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE
OF JOHN MARSHALL 143-45 (1910) (while Jefferson, concerned about reelection and
strengthening his party, did not openly criticize Marshall's assertion of judicial power in
Marbury, his resentment of this position remained with him throughout his life).
In the decade after Marbury, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304
(1816), involved Virginia's assertion that the Supreme Court lacked the authority to review
the judgments of state courts. Even today, Congress routinely grapples with suggestions
that the federal courts are too powerful and should be restrained by congressional control
of their jurisdiction. See, e.g., P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 377-79 (3d ed. 1988) (pro-
viding examples of the more than one hundred proposals introduced in Congress since 1940
that sought to eliminate or restrict the Federal Courts' jurisdiction); Berger, Insulation of
Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's "Court-Stripping" Polemic, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 618 (1983) ("Current assaults on the long-recognized congressional
power are without historical or judicial warrant. ... ). But see Tribe, Jurisdictional Ger-
rymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 129, 155 (1981) (arguing that legislative restrictions on jurisdiction are "too plainly
unconstitutional to even be arguably legitimate, and in any event much too dangerous to be
worth trying").
4. See generally J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 54-59, 82-101 (1901) (discussing Mar-
shall's constitutional opinions and the debates they provoked).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1-2:
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in the district courts.6 The Supreme Court has engendered this
refusal in two primary ways. First, it has narrowly construed some
statutes involving jurisdiction, most notably the federal question
jurisdiction statute7 and the Declaratory Judgment Act.8 In such
circumstances, the Court simply denies the existence of jurisdic-
tion. Second, the Court has developed an assortment of abstention
doctrines9 under which the federal judiciary refuses to adjudicate
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the Untied States shall be a
Party; - to Controversies between two or more States; - between a State and
Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different States, - between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have origi-
nal Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
6. In some circumstances, the authorization is arguably unclear, as in the case of the
well-pleaded complaint rule. See infra notes 33-51 and accompanying text. In most cases,
however, particularly those involving judge-made abstention doctrines, the authorization is
entirely unambiguous. See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
7. Federal question jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), which pro-
vides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
8. Federal declaratory judgments are governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 (1988), and
2202 (1988):
§ 2201. Creation of remedy
(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, .... any court of
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration -shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as
such.
8 2202. Further relief
Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or de-
cree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse
party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
9. The Court has created five categories of federal abstention, each known by the
name of the primary case with which it is associated: Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (abstention to conserve judicial resources
by avoiding parallel federal and state proceedings); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49
(1971) (refusal to enjoin pending state criminal prosecution); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (abstention in eminent domain proceed-
ing to allow state to construe ambiguous state statute); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
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cases clearly within the ambit of both constitutional and statutory
jurisdictional provisions.
Chief Justice Marshall's view of such judicial behavior is not
difficult to divine:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if
it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a
measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution
. . . . We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdic-
tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The
one or the other would be treason to the constitution."0
In Marshall's terms, the courts of the United States commit trea-
son every time they fail to exercise jurisdiction committed to the
federal judiciary."
This Article will address primarily the lack of textual and
historical support for the Court's narrow construction of jurisdic-
tional provisions, that cause it to deny the existence of jurisdic-
tion. In addition, the Article will briefly describe the lack of his-
torical support for the Court's independent development of the
abstention doctrines and their consequent illegitimacy. Both areas
share democratic theory and institutional legitimacy concerns that
Professor Redish will address, but let me respectfully suggest that
these issues are best understood in light of the congressional
thought underlying the Title 28 authorizations."
315, 334 (1943) (abstention to avoid disruption of state administrative process); Railroad
Comm'n of Tx. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (abstention to avoid "the friction
of a premature constitutional adjudication"). The abstention doctrines refusals of jurisdic-
tion will be discussed infra at notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
10. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
11. On rarer occasions, the Supreme Court has also committed treason by assuming
jurisdiction where none may exist. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044
(1983), in which the majority found federal jurisdiction proper in the absence of any clear
showing that the state court decision was primarily based on an adequate and independent
state ground; see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477 (1975), in
which the Court articulated four categories of cases that it will review under 28 U.S.C. §
1257 (1988) as "final" judgments despite the fact that further state court proceedings re-
main. In two of those categories, further state court proceedings either may or will defi-
nitely cause the federal issue to disappear from the case. Id. at 481-83. Thus, the Court's
doctrine causes it to review questions that it would otherwise lack the jurisdiction to reach
if it waited for the conclusion of the state court proceedings.
12. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-40, 1343, 1441 & 2283 (1988) (sections defin-
ing when the district courts have original jurisdiction).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ARISING-UNDER TEST
Federal question jurisdiction has only been exercised by the
district courts since 1875,13 but the full significance of Congress's
decision to confer such jurisdiction is obscured by the lack of leg-
islative history discussing it. A statement by Senator Carpenter of
Maine, then serving as president pro tempore of the Senate, is the
only indication in the Congressional Record of the intended scope
of the new statute; he asserted that the statute was intended to go
to the constitutional limits. 4 Early cases of the Supreme Court of
the United States took the same view. 5 Chief Justice Marshall
first described the constitutional authority for federal question ju-
risdiction in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 6 including
within it any case containing a federal issue that, if contested,
would be outcome-determinative.' 7 The Supreme Court recently
endorsed Osborn in Verlinden B.V v. Central Bank of Nigeria.8
Nonetheless, the statute conferring original federal question juris-
diction on the district courts has given rise to a much more com-
plicated and narrow formulation of federal question jurisdiction.
The Court used several tests for statutory federal question ju-
risdiction in the early twentieth century. Although the well-
13. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470.
The jurisdiction was briefly authorized at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but
the grant did not survive the Jeffersonians' accession to power; see Act of Feb. 13, 1801,
ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132.
14. "Senator Carpenter, recalling Justice Story's argument that Congress was consti-
tutionally required to vest the full scope of federal judicial power in the inferior federal
courts, declared, 'This bill does [vest such power]. . . . This bill gives precisely the power
which the Constitution confers - nothing more, nothing less.'" Doernberg, There's No
Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the
Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 603 (1987) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting 2 CONG. REc. 4986-87 (1874) (statement of Sen. Carpenter)).
15. See, e.g., In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 659 (1893) (federal jurisdiction is con-
ferred over all controversies "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States");
Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885); Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S.
449, 471 (1884); Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1880).
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
17. Id. at 823-24.
18. "The -rule was laid down [in Osborn] that: 'it [is] a sufficient foundation for
jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction
of the constitution or law[s] of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construc-
tion.'" 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824)).
The Verlinden Court did note that Osborn could be read to permit jurisdiction over
cases where no federal issue was actually contested between the parties, but declined to
decide whether such an interpretation of the Constitution was appropriate, since the ques-
tion was not presented in Verlinden. Id. at 492-93.
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pleaded complaint rule developed in stages from 1888 to 1908,
when the Court decided Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mot-
tley,'9 it was not until 1916 that Justice Holmes announced the
first positive test for federal question jurisdiction. In American
Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co.,2 0 he declared that "[a] suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action."21 By 1921,
the Court moved to another formulation that harkened back to
the Osborn test:
The general rule is that where it appears from the bill or
statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon
the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and that such federal claim is not merely colora-
ble, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District Court
has jurisdiction ... "
By 1936, when Justice Cardozo delivered the Court's opinion
in Gully v. First National Bank,2s a four-part test seemed to have
developed:
To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created
by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an
element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion. . . .The right or immunity must be such that it will be
supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are
given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive an-
other. . . .A genuine and present controversy, not merely a
possible or conjectural one, must exist with reference thereto,
...and the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the
complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for
19. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
20. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
21. Id. at 260. However, Justice Holmes's new formulation may be regarded as dic-
tum to which at least three members of his majority did not subscribe. A strong argument
can be made that the case could be, and was, decided on the basis of the well-pleaded
complaint principle. See Doernberg, supra note 14, at 627-30 (suggesting that several
members of the majority were in agreement merely because they believed the well-pleaded
complaint principle was dispositive). Nonetheless, if so, it is at least dictum to which the
Court refers with increasing emphasis. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vaca-
tion Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1983); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 393 (1959).
22. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921). The new
outcome-determinative test was obviously incompatible with Justice Holmes's test from
American Well Works, as the Justice noted acidly in dissent. See id. at 215 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
23. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
1004 [Vol. 40:999
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removal. 24
Justice Cardozo suggested that the need to limit the volume of
cases in the federal courts at least partially explained a restricted
construction of jurisdictional statutes.25 Others have echoed this as
a critical consideration in the Court's federal question
jurisprudence.26
Finally, in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,27
the Court elaborated on the Smith-Gully test by adding "substan-
tiality" as a requirement for federal question jurisdiction where
the cause of action is state-created.28 The Court seems now to in-
sist not only that a well-pleaded federal issue be outcome-determi-
native, but also that it be of substantial importance in the greater
24. Id. at 112-13 (citations omitted).
25. In some of the most famous language in any procedural case, Justice Cardozo
expressed the need for common-sense judgment similar to that used in the treatment of
causation problems:
One could carry the search for causes backward, almost without end. Instead,
there has been a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the
web and lays the other ones aside. As in problems of causation, so here in the
search for the underlying law. If we follow the ascent far enough, countless
claims of right can be discovered to have their source or their operative limits in
the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself with its circumam-
bient restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts
have formulated the distinction between controversies that are basic and those
that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that are
merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by.
Id. at 117-18 (citations omitted).
26. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950)
(observing the possibility of unduly swelling the amount of litigation in federal courts);
Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REy. 639,
673 (1942) (criticizing the cluttering of state courts to keep the federal dockets clear);
Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Fed-
eral Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 906 (1967) (pointing out the fear of significantly adding
"to the workload of an overburdened federal judiciary"); Forrester, The Nature of a "Fed-
eral Question," 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 379 n.61 (1942) (describing the restriction of federal
court jurisdiction to decrease case load); London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction - A
Snare and a Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV. 835, 839 (1959) (commenting that the Supreme
Court would understandably be reluctant to construe a statute in a way that would increase.
the workload of the federal courts).
27. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
28. See id. at 814. The Court has implied that the substantiality requirement is sat-
isfied if the cause of action is created by federal law, since Congress would then have
determined that federal jurisdiction should extend to the .ase: "[C]ongressional determina-
tion that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tanta-
mount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute
as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently 'substantial' to confer federal-
question jurisdiction." Id. (footnote omitted).
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scheme of things.29 To be sure, it is not entirely clear that the
Court thought it was altering the test for federal question jurisdic-
tion, but the majority opinion in Merrell Dow, denying jurisdic-
tion, did not explain its result on the ground that Smith-Gully
compelled it. Rather, the Court engaged in an exegesis of the rea-
sons underlying federal question jurisdiction.30
The Merrell Dow Court made one other change in the inter-
pretative technique applicable to federal question cases. Noting
that Congress intended no federally-created cause of action to ex-
ist under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Court
inferred that Congress also intended to exclude from federal ques-
tion jurisdiction state-created claims dependent upon constructions
or interpretations of the Act. 1 Thus, the Court credited the 1938
Congress that passed the FDCA with an unspoken intention to
place a gloss on the interpretation of a different statute in a differ-
ent title of the United States Code, and this with no affirmative
evidence that Congress ever contemplated the effect of the FDCA
on federal question jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it now seems that
when a state-created claim incorporates some provision of sub-
stantive federal law, one must ask whether the Congress that
passed the law simultaneously but silently contemplated a change
in the scope of federal question jurisdiction.32
II. THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
Of the four elements Justice Cardozo articulated in Gully,
the best-known limiting construction by the Supreme Court is the
"well-pleaded complaint" rule, which is most often associated with
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley.33 Under that rule, a
case does not arise under federal law unless the plaintiff must
plead the federal matter in order to state a claim upon which re-
lief may be granted.3 4 Thus, cases in which important federal is-
sues are raised first in defense, even if the federal issue is the only
contested matter, cannot be heard in the inferior federal courts.
29. See id. at 814 n.12 (suggesting that the nature of the federal interest involved
will be evaluated).
30. See id. at 813-17 (noting the importance of Congressional determination, the
need for uniform statutory construction, and the novelty of the federal issue presented).
31. See id. at 814.
32. This view also presents the structural difficulty of allowing Congress effectively
to amend a statute without sending the amendment through the normal legislative process.
33. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
34. Id. at 153.
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Given the Supreme Court's limited ability to accept cases for re-
view, such cases may never be reviewed by any federal court.
It is more than difficult to find any textual basis or legislative
historical support for the well-pleaded complaint rule. The word-
ing of the federal question statute parallels the wording of the
Constitution, and nothing in the text suggests that a different
meaning was intended. Indeed, the intuitive presumption is that
the same words were used because the same meaning was in-
tended.3 5 Therefore, in looking for a different meaning, the text is
not illuminating. Moreover, the legislative history offers no help.
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that there is no legislative
history for the federal question statute. Only Senator Carpenter's
statement in the records of Congress breaks the silence. 6
Silence may not be without its significance, however, and
some have asserted that Congress's repeated recodifications of the
federal question statute since the announcement of the well-
pleaded complaint rule represent anything from congressional ac-
quiescence to congressional endorsement of the rule. 7 There are
at least three problems with such an assertion. First, with all re-
spect to Simon and Garfunkel, the sounds of silence are very diffi-
cult to interpret accurately; silence may connote different things
to different people. Second, construing congressional silence fol-
lowing judicial announcement of law as acquiescence effectively
reverses the proper functioning of the legislative and judicial
branches, raising substantial separation-of-powers concerns that
Professor Redish has noted. 8 Third, since the judiciary's test for
federal question jurisdiction has changed over time, to which ver-
sion should Congress be considered to have subscribed?
For example, after the Court had announced the well-pleaded
complaint rule, Congress recodified the federal question jurisdic-
35. 1 am sensitive to the fact that the words were used by different groups of legisla-
tors, the constitutional provision having been drafted by the framers and the statute being
the creation of a Congress nearly a century later. Nonetheless, Congress obviously was
aware of the constitutional language, and made a remarkably poor choice of words if, in
fact, a different meaning was intended.
36. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
37. See Doernberg, supra note 14, at 659 n.270.
38. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Func-
tion, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) [hereinafter Redish, Abstention]. If one takes the position
that Congress in fact intended as broad a jurisdictional sweep as Senator Carpenter sug-
gested, then continued adherence to the well-pleaded complaint rule may be viewed as a
form of abstention.
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CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tion statute in 1911.31 That recodification might be taken to re-
present congressional approval of the rule, though it might also
betoken congressional inattention. There was no recodification be-
tween American Well Works4" and the outcome-determinative
test announced in Smith,41 so Congress cannot be understood to
have commented silently on the Holihes formulation.42 Following
Smith and Gully,43 however, the federal question statute was re-
codified in 1948, 44 1958, 45 1976,48 and 1980.47 If those recodifica-
tions are to be taken as endorsements of the Court's interpretation
of the statute in Smith and its subsequent restatement of that in-
terpretation in Gully, then does not the Court's new interpretation
of the statute in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson", fly
in the face of those supposed congressional endorsements of the
Court's prior treatment of the statute, thereby presenting signifi-
cant separation-of-powers problems? Certainly, if Congress had
specifically enacted the Gully test, it would be grossly improper
for the Court to add elements to it because the Court thought the
congressional standard overbroad or under-inclusive. As the Court
has often advised:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a
particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the
meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality
determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit
as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of
veto.
* . . [I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the
39. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091.
40. American Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916); see supra
notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
41. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); see supra note 22
and accompanying text.
42. This may be an overstatement. Perhaps Congress's failure to repudiate Justice
Holmes's formulation represents acquiescence. This, however, is even more slender a reed
on which to base such a conclusion than is recodification. Moreover, .enough of a question
has been raised about whether Holmes's formulation was holding or dictum to make reli-
ance on congressional inaction in this instance quite suspect. See supra note 21.
43. 299 U.S. 109 (1936); see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
44. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1331, 62 Stat. 869, 930.
45. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1331(a), 72 Stat. 415.
46. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 733(2), 90 Stat. 2721.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
48. 478 U.S. 804 (1986); see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt con-
gressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with
"'common sense and the public weal." Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches. 9
Recently, a majority of the Court argued strongly against in-
ferring legislative ratification from congressional silence: "Con-
gress' failure to overturn a statutory precedent is [not] reason for
this Court to adhere to it. It is 'impossible to assert with any de-
gree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' af-
firmative congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpre-
tation."5 Thus, the argument that subsequent congressional
silence is an endorsement of the Court's interpretation of the juris-
diction statutes may prove too much.5 Treason to the Constitu-
tion is insidious.
III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CASES
The Court's convoluted method of determining whether there
is jurisdiction over complaints seeking declaratory relief is well-
known, though not well-liked."' Writing for the Court in Skelly
49. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978).
50. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372 n.1 (1989) (quoting
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
The Court went on to express its concern about "the danger of placing undue reliance on
the concept of congressional 'ratification.'" Id. The Court's warning in that instance was
addressed to Justice Brennan's argument in his concurring and dissenting opinion that con-
gressional action on statutes other than the one then under consideration (28 U.S.C. §
1981 (1982)) might reflect on the proper interpretation of § 1981. The majority apparently
felt that legislation only tangentially related to the statute being construed could not bear
on the statute's proper construction. The Court thus implicitly (and probably unwittingly)
condemned the method of statutory interpretation that it had used in Merrell Dow when it
focused on Congress's passage of the FDCA in 1938 as reflecting on the proper interpreta-
tion of the federal question jurisdiction statute passed in 1875. See supra notes 27-31 and
accompanying text.
51. One might hypothesize that congressional acquiescence implicitly includes license
to the courts to continue to make jurisdictional law, but this, too, raises institutional limita-
tion problems akin to those arising in the area of federal common law in cases where a
jurisdictional grant is taken as a command from Congress for the federal courts to create
common law. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), is probably
the most prominent example of that phenomenon, but the propriety of such a congressional
delegation, whether express or implied, has been sharply questioned. See, e.g., Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957).
52. As the American Law Institute noted: "If no other change were to be made in
federal question jurisdiction, it is arguable that [the Court's method of handling declara-
tory judgment cases] should be repudiated." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DivisIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 171 (1969).
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Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,53 Justice Frankfurter used a
syllogism to arrive at the technique now used by the federal
courts.5" The major premise was that Congress, in passing the De-
claratory Judgment Act,55 intended no expansion of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. 6 The minor premise was that to evaluate a de-
claratory judgment complaint on its face, as any other complaint
is evaluated, would allow some cases to come into the federal
courts that could not have been brought there without the Declar-
atory Judgment Act. The Court therefore concluded that a com-
plaint seeking declaratory relief should not be evaluated on its
face. Instead, Skelly directed that the jurisdictional 'analysis be
performed on a hypothetical coercive complaint that the plaintiff
would have had to file in the absence of the Declaratory Judgment
Act." If there would have been jurisdiction over the hypothetical
coercive action, then the declaratory judgment action is deemed
also to satisfy the test for federal question jurisdiction. In this
manner, the Court reasoned, only cases that could have been
heard in federal court without the Declaratory Judgment Act can
be heard under its aegis, depriving it of any jurisdiction-expanding
effect.58
The Court continues to adhere to the Skelly method and the
well-pleaded complaint rule despite Justice Brennan's admission
in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
that "[t]he rule . . . may produce awkward results." 59 There, the
Court reaffirmed Skelly's vitality and, in fact, extended Skelly's
method of analysis to cases brought under state declaratory judg-
ment acts.
One must plumb the depths of Franchise Tax Board fully to
53. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
54. Justice Frankfurter apparently forgot Oliver Wendell Holmes's observation:
"[T]he law is administered by able and experienced men, who know too much to sacrifice
good sense to a syllogism." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
55. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§
2201-2202 (1988)).
56. "'[The operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.' . . .
Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend
their jurisdiction." Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 671 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227 (1937)).
57. Skelly Oil, 339 U.S. at 673-74.
58. The details of the Court's reasoning are set out in Doernberg & Mushlin, The
Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Ex-
panded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV.
529 (1989) [hereinafter Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse].
59. 463 U.S. 1, 12 (1963).
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understand how strange a case it is. California's Franchise Tax
Board filed a two-count complaint in state court because the Con-
struction Laborers Vacation Trust refused to honor tax levies di-
rected at the assets of three of its members. The first count of the
complaint sought damages for the Trust's refusal to honor the le-
vies. The second count, responding to the Trust's position that the
Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 60 com-
manded refusal, sought a declaration that ERISA did not pre-
empt the levies.61 Consistently with Skelly, the Court looked to
the coercive complaint (count one) underlying the declaratory
judgment action (count two) and declared both counts not to arise
under federal law, since the Trust's ERISA argument would arise
in defense to the Franchise Tax Board's attempt to collect the
taxes.62
That analysis seems straightforward enough, and it certainly
conforms to the analytical pattern that the Court had prescribed
in Skelly Oil. The picture is complicated however, because the
Court recognized63 that federal law allowed the Trust to bring its
own coercive action to enjoin invasions of the ERISA-qualifying
fund. 64 Moreover, the statute makes the cause of action exclu-
sively federal. 5 Thus, if the Trust had sued for an injunction, the
action would have had to be maintained in federal court. In addi-
tion, if the Trust had brought an action seeking declaratory relief,
under the Skelly analysis that case would have arisen under fed-
eral law. Such a result is anomalous because both the Franchise
Tax Board and the Trust would have been seeking an answer to
the same declaratory judgment question: "Does ERISA pre-
empt?" 6 For the characterization of a question as federal or not
60. Employees Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
61. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 4.
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 19-20.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), (e)(1) (1988).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
66. Adherence to the Skelly analysis creates one more possible anomaly in the situa-
tion where the Trust gets to the courthouse first. Irrespective of the fact that Congress
elected to allow ERISA trustees to maintain actions to establish the inviolability of trust
funds, ERISA's pre-emption is nonetheless a defense to actions seeking to invade trust
funds. Many such actions, and certainly the one in Franchise Tax Board, are state-created
and do not arise under federal law. Only two years after Skelly, and two decades before
Franchise Tax Board, the Court had held:
Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks in essence to
assert a defense to an impending or threatened state court action, it is the char-
acter of the threatened action, and not of the defense, which will determine
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to depend only upon the identity of the questioner is bizarre.
The Court attempted to rationalize the result in Franchise
Tax Board by referring back. to Skelly Oil, arguing that "fidelity
to its spirit leads us to extend it to state declaratory judgment
actions as well."' 7 The Court did not explain how presumed con-
gressional intent not to have the federal Declaratory Judgment
Act expand federal jurisdiction was at all served by limiting the
ambit of state declaratory judgment procedures. 8 Nonetheless,
Franchise Tax Board clearly confirms that the hypothetical coer-
cive complaint is the indispensable ingredient in the jurisdictional
analysis of any complaint seeking declaratory relief.
Unfortunately, the major premise of Justice Frankfurter's
syllogism is unsupportable. Congress specifically contemplated
that the Declaratory Judgment Act would expand federal question
jurisdiction with respect to at least two, and possibly three, cate-
whether there is federal-question jurisdiction in the District Court. If the causi
of action which the declaratory defendant threatens to assert does not itself in-
volve a claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may entertain an
action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to that claim. This is
dubious even though the federal complaint sets forth a claim of federal right, if
that right is in reality in the nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action.
Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952). Thus, under
Wycoffs theory, the Construction Laborers Vacation Trust's declaratory action should not
be heard in the federal courts. Wycoff and Skelly Oil seem thus to be in conflict. On the
other hand, "[i]t is not beyond the power of Congress to confer a right to a declaratory
judgment in a case or controversy arising under federal law . . . without regard to Skelly
Oil's particular application of the well-pleaded complaint rule." P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P.
MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 1033 n.17.
67. 463 U.S. at 17-18. The anomalies presented by Franchise Tax Board merely
serve to illustrate that forays into the spirit world are perilous at best, and, with apologies
to Marshall McLuhan, suggest that whatever medium the Court consulted returned with
the wrong message.
68. State statutes often expand federal question jurisdiction. For example, at least
prior to Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), if a state
cause of action incorporated federal law, the incorporation served as a predicate for federal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). The
Merrell Dow majority asserted that Smith is undisturbed. 478 U.S. at 814 n.12. Even if
Merrell Dow has modified the Smith-Gully jurisdictional test as previously suggested, see
supra notes 27-31, it clearly does not preclude state-created causes of action incorporating
federal law as a standard of decision, thus qualifying cases for federal question jurisdiction.
Therefore, the way is still open for the states to expand federal question jurisdiction by
creating new causes of action.
For example, if a state explicitly created a private right of action for individuals who
were subject to police surveillance while engaged in political activities protected by the first
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. I, a complaint for relief would have to contain an allega-
tion that the police activity complained of violated the plaintiff's first amendment rights.
The federal matter would be well-pleaded, and the case would qualify for jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
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gories of cases:69
(1) a "mirror-image" case, in which the party seeking the' de-
claratory judgment would have been the defendant in a tradi-
tional federal-question coercive action but has not yet been sued;
(2) a "federal-defense" case, in which the defendant asserts a
federal defense to the plaintiff's nonfederal coercive action; and
(3) a "federal-reply" case, in which both the complaint and an-
swer would include only state claims but where the plaintiff's
reply would raise a federal issue."
Congresses considered a declaratory judgment bill and held hear-
ings in 1922,'71 1926,2 and 1928.1a In 1928, the Senate heard
from then-Chief Judge Cardozo, who argued that the device was
"a useful expedient to litigants who would otherwise have acted at
their peril, or at best would have been exposed to harrowing de-
lay," 74 and from Professor Edwin Borchard of Yale,75 who
"describ[ed] categories of cases in which, without the declaratory
judgment, the parties must undergo great risks without knowledge
of the parties' respective entitlements, and conclud[ed] that the
declaratory judgment 'removes all that peril.' "76 Representative
Gilbert also highlighted the usefulness of the device: "Under the
69. The legislative history of the 1934 Act is misleading:
"There were no debates or hearings held in either the House or the Senate on
the 1934 Bill. The consideration by each chamber was limited to a brief sum-
mary of the Bill by its sponsors, followed by a voice vote. 78 Cong. Rec. 10564-
65, 10919 (1934) (consideration of the Bill by the'Senate); 78 Cong. Rec. 8224
(1934) (consideration of the Bill by the House)."
Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse, supra note 58, at 561 n.151. However, the
Declaratory Judgment Act was the product of a fifteen-year battle for federal adoption of
declaratory judgment, and there is extensive legislative history, including detailed testi-
mony from many legal scholars and representatives of the bar about why the act was
needed and what it was contemplated to do. For a detailed discussion of that history, see
id. at 547-73.
70. Id. at 548 (footnotes omitted).
71. Hearings on H.R. 1043 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1922).
72. Hearings on H.R. 5365 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1926).
73. Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) [hereinafter 1928 Senate Hearings].
74. Id. at 16.
75. Professor Borchard was the prime mover in the enactment of a federal declara-
tory judgment provision. See Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse supra note: 58, at
551 n.93. He has been described by the Supreme Court as "a principal proponent and
author" of the Act. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 468 n.18 (1974).
76. Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse, supra note 58, at 562 n.154 (citing
1928 Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 34-35).
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present law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the light
to see if you stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judgment
law you turn on the light and then take the step."' 7
At the 1928 Senate Hearings, "the testimony focused on pro-
viding a federal forum for parties who had already been accorded
one in state court."'78 For example, Congress specifically contem-
plated a new class of actions in the federal courts for alleged pat-
ent infringers who, rather than waiting to be sued by the paten-
tees, wanted an early determination of the parties' rights and
liabilities. This would have enabled the alleged infringers to deter-
mine whether they could proceed with their business activity in
safety, without the fear of damages piling up until the patentee
decided to sue.79
The Supreme Court's approach to such cases has been schizo-
phrenic. It has endorsed the reasoning and result of American
77. 69 CONG. REc. 2030 (1928).
78. Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse, supra note 58, at 563 n.155. More
recently, no less an advocate of limited federal jurisdiction than Justice Rehnquist noted:
[T]he legislative history of the [Act] suggests that its primary purpose was to
enable persons to obtain a definition of their rights before an actual injury oc-
curred. . . .Congress was apparently aware at the time it passed the Act that
persons threatened with state criminal prosecutions might choose to forego the
offending conduct and instead seek a federal declaration of their rights.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 478 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
79. Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse, supra note 58, at 564, 570-71. Ameri-
can Well Works fits this mold, but there the alleged infringer declined to wait for the
patentee to act, instead asserting a state-created claim for trade libel and seeking damages
of its own by reason of the patentee's threats to sue and statements to American Well
Works' customers and potential customers. American Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co.,
241 U.S. 257, 258-59. In American Well Works, despite the fact that patent questions
clearly would dominate the litigation, the Court ruled that the case was not federal because
state law had created the cause of action. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. The
presence of patent questions in a state court case presented no problem. "[S]tate courts
routinely adjudicate cases containing patent questions but not brought under the patent
laws." Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse, supra note 58, at 577 n.214 (citing Pratt
v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897)); see also, e.g., Geni-Chlor Int'l, Inc.,
v. Multisonics Dev. Corp., 580 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1978); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packag-
ing Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); American Harley Corp. v. Irvin Indus. Inc., 27
N.Y.2d 168, 263 N.E.2d 552, 315 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976
(1971).
Although Justice Holmes's formulation of the test for federal question jurisdiction was
not the dominant test for long, see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text, even under
the formulation adopted by the Court in Smith and Gully, there would have been no juris-
diction in American Well Works. See Doernberg, supra note 14, at 627-28, 630. On either
view of the proper jurisdictional test, however, it is no exaggeration to regard the Declara-
tory Judgment Act to have been intended, in part, to overrule the decision in American
Well Works.
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Well Works, in which the alleged patent infringer was held not to
have a federal question action for damages."s It has also reaf-
firmed the theory and reasoning of Skelly Oil.8' Finally, having
approved Justice Frankfurter's major premise that the Declara-
tory Judgment Act was intended to have no effect on federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, the Court has also approved E. Edelmann Co. v.
Triple-A Specialty Co.,82 a case identical in pattern to American
Well Works, but one in which the plaintiff sought declaratory in-
stead of coercive relief.83 That the Court did all of this in the
same case merely highlights the discontinuity in its thinking.
To be sure, commentators voiced substantial jurisdictional
concerns during the fifteen-year battle to get a federal declaratory
judgment provision. Those concerns, however, did not involve the
scope of the federal question jurisdiction statute. Instead, they
centered around the case-or-controversy clause,84 and the Court
has implicitly acknowledged as much:
[The Declaratory Judgment Act's] enabling clause was nar-
rower than that of the Uniform Act adopted in 1921 by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which gave comprehen-
sive power to declare rights, status and other legal relations. The
federal Act omits status and limits the declaration to cases of
actual controversy.
This Act was adjudged constitutional only by interpreting it
to confine the declaratory remedy within conventional "case or
controversy" limits.8
80. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1983).
81. Id. at 15-18.
82. 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937).
83. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19 n.19. The incompatibility of these three cases
is discussed extensively in Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse, supra note 58, at
573-79. The Court had explicitly endorsed the analytical method exemplified by Edelmann,
but without citation to the case, in Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S.
237, 248 (1952) (dictum). See supra note 66.
84. U.S. CONsT. art. Ill, § 2. For a discussion of the debate centering around the
case-or-controversy clause, see Doernberg & Mushlin, History Comes Calling: Dean Gris-
wold Offers New Evidence About the Jurisdictional Debate Surrounding the Enactment of
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 37 UCLA L. REv. 139 (1989) [hereinafter Doernberg &
Mushlin, History Comes Calling]; Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse, supra note
58, at 566-73.
85. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241-42 (1952) (foot-
note omitted). The Court continued:
In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, .. the Court said,
"The Act of June 14, 1934, providing for declaratory judgments, does not at-
tempt to change the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial power" which
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Thus, to assert as Justice Frankfurter did in Skelly Oil that the
Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to have no jurisdictional
effect,86 confuses the issue because of the imprecision of the word
"jurisdiction. ' 87 Case-or-controversy problems in individual cases
can be handled without eliminating whole classes of disputes from
the statutory jurisdictional grant to the federal courts.8 8 When the
Declaratory Judgment Act was passed, Congress and the Court
focused on case-or-controversy problems and decided that they
could be surmounted.
Review of the legislative history of the Declaratory Judgment
Act permits one to say with fair assurance that Congress did in-
tend to expand the federal question jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Thus, the Supreme Court's refusal to accept the grant con-
stitutes an additional instance of the federal courts' failure to ex-
ercise their jurisdiction, and one that directly contravenes congres-
sional intent. Treason to the Constitution becomes bolder.
IV. JUDGE-MADE ABSTENTION DOCTRINES
Abstention by its nature is a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.8"
If jurisdiction does not exist, one never reaches the question of
whether to abstain. Federal abstention has .two sources: acts of
Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court. Congress has
directed abstention, inter alia, in the Johnson Act of 1934,90 the
still was to be tested by such established principles as that "the judicial power
does not extend to ... abstract questions" and that "claims based merely upon
,assumed potential invasions' of rights are not enough to warrant judicial
intervention."
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, . . . Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes used the whole catalogue of familiar phrases to define and de-
limit the measure of this new remedy . . . . It applies, he points out, only to
"cases and controversies in the constitutional sense" of a nature "consonant with
the exercise of the judicial function" and "appropriate for judicial determina-
tion." Each must present a "justiciable controversy.
Id. at 242.
86. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
87. Ironically, Justice Frankfurter himself was well aware of the word's fuzzy bound-
aries and meanings. Doernberg & Mushlin, The Trojan Horse, supra note 58, at 570 &
n.188
88. See, e.g., Doernberg & Mushlin, History Comes Calling, supra note 84, at 143-
44.
89. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 303 (4th ed. 1983)
(describing abstention as "circumstances under which a federal court may decline to pro-
ceed though it has jurisdiction under the Constitution and the statutes").
90. Ch. 283, 48 Stat. 775 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988)).
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Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 1 and the Anti-Injunction Act of
1948,92 each of which directs the federal courts to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction in specified situations. For its part, the Su-
preme Court has sought to improve on Congress's work by creat-
ing five abstenti6n doctrines of its own, known as Pullman, Bur-
ford, Thibodaux, Younger, and Colorado River abstentions. 93
Thus, federal jurisdiction is eschewed either because Congress has
specifically directed or because the Court, despite an unambiguous
congressional grant of jurisdiction, refuses for its own policy rea-
sons to exercise the jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court rejects what
it implicitly construes as a congressional "offer" of jurisdiction. To
do so effectively ignores the important institutional question of
whether it is an offer that cannot be refused.94
Of the abstention doctrines created by theCourt, the doctrine
of Younger v. Harris95 may present the clearest example of juris-
dictional abdication by the federal courts. The doctrine originally
prohibited federal courts from interfering with pending state crim-
inal prosecutions,96 but it has been extended since Younger to in-
91. Ch. 726, 50 Stat. 738 (1937) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1341- (1988)).
92. Ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (current version at U.S.C. § 2283 (1988)).
"[S]tatutorily-dictated abstention is [also] found in . . . the since-modified Three-Judge
Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982); and the exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982)." Redish, Abstention, supra note 38, at 74 n.18. Congress passed
the original Anti-Injunction Act in 1793, Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22 § 55, 1 Stat. 334,
and made only modifications to it between 1793 and 1948.
93. For a discussion of the abstention doctrines, see supra note 9. Brief discussions of
the history and elements of each of these doctrines may be found in M. REDISH, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 281-304, 337-74 (2d ed.
1990), and C. WRIGHT, supra note 89, § 52-52A, at 302-30.
94. It may not stretch the point too much to borrow from the well-known maxim of
statutory construction and suggest that Congress, in creating some abstention doctrines,
has implicitly excluded the propriety of the existence of others. "Expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius." which means "[T]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979).
95. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Although the doctrine is today known as Younger absten-
tion, its origins can be traced to In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888). See Zeigler, An
Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce
Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 269-71
(1976) [hereinafter Zeigler, Accommodation].
96. Intervention was permitted if the plaintiff could demonstrate that there was no
adequate remedy at law and that the plaintiff would suffer great, immediate, and irrepara-
ble harm unless the federal court intervened. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 ("[Federal
courts] have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal actions . . . where the
danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate." (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240, 243 (1926))). The Court specifically noted that "the cost, anxiety, and inconve-
nience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution [was not irreparable harm
within the meaning of the doctrine.]" Id. at 46.
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elude technically civil proceedings "in aid of and closely related to
criminal statutes, ' 9 7 actions seeking reform of state executive
practices,98 state-initiated civil actions,99 state administrative pro-
ceedings, 100 and private civil actions involving enforcement of
state judgments.'
The Younger doctrine is the best example of judicial refusal
of jurisdiction because of its close relation to actions brought
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,102 and the relationship of
these actions to congressionally-directed abstention. Since most
cases involving the Younger abstention doctrine are brought under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, "[v]irtually every major Supreme
Court case dealing with Younger abstention involves allegations of
state violation of federal constitutional rights.' 03  Civil rights
cases also frequently involve plaintiffs' requests for some form of
federal interference with state judicial proceedings, whether in the
form of an injunction against a pending prosecution,'04 a declara-
tion that a statute on which a pending state prosecution is based
violates federal constitutional rights,'0 5 or an order suppressing ev-
97. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
98. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976) (action seeking structural
reform of police disciplinary procedures); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (action
seeking injunctive relief against state judicial officers).
99. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 418 (1979) (child abuse action initiated
by state authorities); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 435 (1977) (civil action brought
by Illinois Department of Public Aid to retrieve fraudulently concealed assets).
100. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S.
619, 621 (1986) (private action seeking injunction against state administrative proceeding).
101. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (action seeking to
enjoin state court from exercising its judgment pending appeal to state appellate court).
102. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1982)).
103. Telephone interview with Donald H. Zeigler, professor of law at New York
Law School (Sept. 15, 1989). Professor Zeigler has argued forcefully that the Younger
doctrine is supported neither by history nor by sound policy. See Zeigler, Federal Court
Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine from
a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 31, 32 (1985) (arguing that the Younger
doctrine be should abandoned); Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light
of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 988 (arguing federal
courts' refusal to exercise equitable jurisdiction contravenes congressional intent in adopt-
ing the fourteenth amendment and in enacting section 1983); Zeigler, Accommodation,
supra note 95, at 269 (suggesting a compromise between adherence to the Younger doc-
trine and federal protection of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights.).
104. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39 (1971) (appellee sought to enjoin
district attorney from prosecuting him in violation of his first and fourteenth amendment
rights).
105. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 67 (1971) (appellant sought decla-
ration that state criminal anarchy statute was unconstitutional).
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idence alleged to have been seized in violation of the fourth
amendment.0'0
In the Anti-Injunction Act, Congress commanded federal
courts to refrain from enjoining state proceedings "except as ex-
pressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid
of [the courts'] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate [the
courts'] judgments." 07 However, Mitchum v. Foster'0 8 held that
the first exception includes actions brought under section 1983.19
Thus, the Court concedes that Congress intended the federal
courts to continue to grant the full range of relief in civil rights
cases, even at the cost of interfering with the state courts.110
As demonstrated by the mounting number of cases in which
Younger abstention is ordered, the federal courts have refused to
accept either the original congressional grant of jurisdiction"' or
Congress's implicit declaration in the first exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act, as interpreted by Mitchum v. Foster,"2 that civil
rights actions are of such importance that they should be heard in
federal court even if the price of doing so is, in the words of the
Act, "an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court. .. .
Thus, the Supreme Court refuses not one but two congressional
directives in allowing the federal courts to proceed in civil rights
cases. Indeed, under the Court's abstention doctrine, it is even
possible for a civil rights case to begin in the federal courts when
no state proceeding is pending, only to be aborted when a state
criminal proceeding is subsequently brought." 4 As a result of
Younger abstention, large numbers of cases qualifying under any
test for federal question jurisdiction, and that Congress has chosen
not to foreclose through the Anti-Injunction Act, nonetheless will
not be heard by the federal courts. Treason to the Constitution is
rampant.
106. See, e.g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971) (suppression order reversed
because it violated the Younger doctrine).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
108. 407 U.S. 225, 231-38 (1972).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
110. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.
111. Jurisdiction over actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) can be in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343 (1988).
112. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243; see supra text accompanying note 108.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
114. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1975).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has flatly refused to permit the exercise
of jurisdiction over whole classes of cases committed to the federal
judiciary by Congress. Ironically, the Court recently excoriated a
district judge who remanded a diversity case to the state courts
for the understandable, if not legally justifiable, reason that the
federal court's docket was too crowded to permit efficient disposi-
tion.115 Indeed, the Court has regularly expressed the thought,
though in terms less dramatic than Chief Justice Marshall's, that
federal courts may not decline to adjudicate individual cases
within their jurisdiction."16 But the Court's own invention of the
well-pleaded complaint rule, its method of dealing with declara-
tory judgment actions, and the proliferation of abstention doc-
trines not created by Congress result in the rejection of federal
jurisdiction over large blocks of cases. It is apparently permissible
to do wholesale what cannot be done retail. Treason to the Consti-
tution is a volume business.
There is little or no textual or historical support for the ways
in which the Supreme Court has directed the federal judicial sys-
tem to refuse parts of its jurisdiction. Thus, there is no positive
doctrine counseling such refusal that is anchored in anything
other than the Court's predilections for how the federal system
ought to work. The Court's repeated refusals of jurisdictional
grants raise important questions of democratic theory and institu-
115.
[A]n otherwise properly removed action may no more be remanded because the
district court considers itself too busy to try it than an action properly filed in
the federal court in the first instance may be dismissed or referred to state courts
for such reason. . . . [Clases properly removed from state to federal court
within the federal court's jurisdiction may not be remanded for discretionary
reasons not authorized by the controlling statute.
Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 & 345 n.9 (1976) (citations
omitted).
116. "It, therefore, appeared ... that the Circuit Court had practically abandoned
its jurisdiction over a case of which it had cognizance, and turned the matter over for
adjudication to the state court. This, it has been steadily held, a Federal court may not
do." McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910) (citing Chicot County v. Sherwood,
148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893)). In Chicot, the Court held that:
"[T]he courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to
afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction
extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of
another jurisdiction. . . . This principle has been steadily adhered to by this
court."
Chicot County, 148 U.S. at 534 (citations omitted).
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tional legitimacy in the Constitutional system. Those questions
echo Chief Justice Marshall's warning about treason to the Con-
stitution. For that discussion, we turn to Professor Redish.

